Executive summary

The world is in a state of climate crisis, with science providing an ever-clearer view of the dire consequences of climate change. 2023 was the warmest year on record (WMO 2024). The incidence of natural disasters has increased fivefold over the last five decades (WMO 2021), and economic damages in the first half of 2024 alone have already reached nearly USD 128 billion (Atlas Magazine 2024). Underlining the gravity of the situation, the UN Secretary-General warned that we may be nearing critical planetary tipping points, beyond which recovery could be impossible (UNSG 2023).

Despite the urgency of the climate crisis, global action has been limited. According to the latest UN report, without an increase in ambition in the new NDCs and immediate action, global temperatures could rise by 2.6 to 3.1°C over the course of this century (UNEP 2024). Notably, research also suggests that developed countries are not on track to meet their 2030 targets and, more importantly, that even if they were to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, they would still consume 40–50 per cent of the carbon budget available to keep temperature rise below 1.5°C (CEEW 2023). Ironically, given these projections, the current situation is no different from that in the pre-2020 era where progress was limited due to the non-participation of major developed economies, inflated base year emissions, and accounting loopholes (CEEW 2021). While this reiterates that climate actions are and have been insufficient, there is an even more pressing underlying issue – the limited power of international climate agreements to hold countries accountable for their immediate actions. As a testament to this, climate debates have been ridden with ambiguity, with crucial facets of climate action remaining unresolved and contentious, such as equity in the carbon budget, climate finance and its goals, and adaptation funding.

Therefore, it is now more important than ever to hold countries accountable, not just for their actions on mitigation, but also for other facets that are critical to climate action. To this end, few institutions from the Global North have made notable efforts to bridge the accountability gap by showcasing countries’ actual progress more transparently.

A. Existing accountability efforts

Several independent global efforts are tracking and assessing the implementation of climate actions by countries. The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) was one of the earliest projects to evaluate government actions against the Paris Agreement goal of limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C, incorporating fairness as a factor in emission reduction assessments. Similarly, the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) examines countries’ emissions, energy trajectories, and related policy measures, offering insights into the country’s past and current environmental protection performance trajectory. Likewise, the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) also contributes by providing a data-driven summary of the state of climate across the world.

Most of these indices offer detailed insights into national policies, recent developments, and future emission pathways and projections. However, their scope is primarily limited to one or two themes of climate action, with an emphasis on mitigation. To gain a comprehensive view of a country’s climate efforts, it is important to consider other emerging critical aspects, such as international cooperation, climate adaptation, and means of implementation. Further, with limited research originating from Global South, it is often difficult to reflect on how the different realities and circumstances of the developed and developing world are considered across the assessments.

B. CEEW’s Climate Accountability Matrix​

To address some of these gaps and build on available knowledge, CEEW developed the Climate Accountability Matrix (CAM). The CAM adopts an evidence-based approach to analyse countries’ climate efforts and endeavours to nudge them to strengthen the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Importantly, it is a first-of-its-kind assessment tool from the Global South to analyse countries’ performance in climate aspects beyond mitigation, including adaptation and means of implementation. To this end, the CAM considers the fundamental principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) to hold countries accountable not just for their promises but for their immediate actions.

The outcomes of the CAM will help provide critical inputs and recommendations for upcoming climate summits and the second Global Stocktake (GST), where countries and non-party stakeholders will deliberate on the implementation and ambitions of global climate efforts. These recommendations can provide the evidence-based insights that both developed and developing countries require to formulate negotiation positions. Additionally, they will help inform the next round of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) in 2025, prompting governments to strengthen existing economy-wide and sector-specific targets for 2030 and set new goals for 2035 and beyond.

C. Countries and assessment​

In this study, the Council has considered the G202 countries as they comprise the world’s largest developed and emerging economies, responsible for 76 per cent of the world’s GHG emissions (G20 Brasil 2024). They also account for over 80 per cent of the global gross domestic product (GDP), 75 per cent of international trade, and roughly 60 per cent of the global population (G20 Italia, 2021). These countries should spearhead the green transition required to limit the rise in global temperature to 1.5°C.

The CAM assessment of countries considers 42 indicators grouped into five critical themes as follows.

• International cooperation: Assess engagement in key climate agreements and adherence to obligations.

• National measures: Evaluate a country’s ambition, emission footprint, and domestic climate frameworks.

• Sectoral robustness: Assess the operational efficiency and actions of key sectors (such as energy, industry, transport, waste, agriculture, forestry, and water) towards realising a sustainable transition.

• Enablers: Analyse the means of implementation (finance, technology, and capacity-building) at national and international levels.

• Climate adaptation efforts: Assess the readiness and recovery capacity of the country to adapt to current and changing climate impacts.

The themes, categories (ES Figure 1), and respective indicators3 are outcomes of meticulous research, review of the existing literature, and consultations with thematic experts to holistically capture the areas of climate action identified. The indicators (details of which can be found in Annexure I) serve as a measurable mix of quantitative and qualitative variables designed to assess the performance of countries’ actions undertaken in the categorical areas identified under each theme.

ES Figure 1 CAM overview: Themes and categories

Source: Authors’ conceptualisation

The CAM, as a principle, is guided by equity4 and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), aiming to hold countries accountable for their immediate actions rather than solely their promises. To reflect this principle, Annex I Parties (mostly industrialised developed countries) and Non-Annex I (mostly developing countries) are assessed separately. For the quantitative indicators in the framework, they are assessed based on the relative performance in their groups, while for the qualitative indicators judgement criteria differs between the developing and developed countries. Details on the indicators and their criteria for judgement have been provided in Annexure I. Each indicator is equally weighted and scored from 0 to 1, with the scores then aggregated to arrive at the thematic and overall outcomes for each country. The overall outcomes are ultimately grouped into four performance categories that elucidate countries’ willingness and preparedness to translate their climate commitments into measurable progress leaders, reasonable efforts, limited efforts, and needs improvement.

D. Outcomes of the Climate Accountability Matrix​

As depicted in ES Figure 2, the analysis shows that none of the G20 members currently qualify as a leader. The countries are broadly distributed among reasonable and limited efforts. They have been engaging positively and have shown considerable national measures. However, measures are needed to improve sectoral robustness and create an enabling environment for ambitious climate actions. The following are some key trends noted across countries:

Overall outcomes of G20 members

E. Key country-wise trends

The UK, EU, France, Japan, and Germany have made notable efforts in climate action, particularly in international cooperation, by actively participating in key climate agreements and adhering to transparency obligations. These countries have also established comprehensive climate governance frameworks and undertaken reasonable adaptation efforts. In the Global South, India, South Africa, and China have made significant progress, actively participating in key agreements and making efforts to adhere to their obligations. India and China are expected to take a shorter transition period to net-zero5 compared to the average for developing countries, with India having lower per capita GHG emissions. In the renewable energy segment, Brazil and India are performing relatively better than other developing countries. Likewise, South Africa has demonstrated strong domestic climate governance and climate-related disclosures.

Developed countries such as the US, Australia, Russia, and Canada show limited efforts. While the US, Australia, and Canada have made efforts to adapt to climate change, concerns regarding their inconsistent engagement in key agreements and weak ambition remains. Further, despite being developed countries, their efforts to support an enabling environment for climate actions are limited.

Finally, major fossil fuel–dependent economies such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey show limited efforts or needs improvement across all the themes. For Saudi Arabia, limited domestic climate governance, high per capita emissions, and the increased number of years required to transition to net-zero pose concerns. Turkey also falls short in the categories of sectoral robustness and enablers, due to its weak green transportation policies, high agriculture emissions, and limited efforts to promote climate actions domestically.

F. Key thematic outcomes​

ES Table 1 Thematic outcomes of G20 countries

Source Authors’ analysis

International cooperation assesses countries’ engagement in key climate agreements and adherence to obligations. Most countries are climate leaders in this theme, with developing countries such as India, South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Indonesia showing positive engagement. However, inconsistent participation of developed countries such as the US, Canada, and Australia undermine overall trust and confidence. With regards to obligations surrounding adherence to reporting guidelines, timely submission remains a concern.

National measures evaluate ambition, emission footprint, and domestic climate frameworks. Within this segment, most of the countries are scattered between reasonable and limited efforts. Developing countries fare better in their GHG emissions per capita than developed countries. However, the key area of concern in this category is the poor performance of developed countries in the pre-2020 period and the greater number of years they are expected to require to transition to net-zero, hindering their overall performance.

Sectoral robustness assesses the operational efficiency and actions of key sectors, such as energy, industry, transport, waste, agriculture, forestry, and water, towards realising sustainable transition. Countries in this segment are showing some progress, with encouraging trends in renewable energy, urban mobility, and afforestation. Fossil fuel consumption per capita remains high in a few developing countries (Argentina, China, South Africa) and major developed countries (the US, Australia, Canada). In agriculture, countries such as Argentina, South Korea, Germany, and Italy perform relatively well mainly because of their higher organic land share.

Enablers analyse the means available, both nationally and internationally, to create an enabling environment for climate action. This remains a major area of concern. France, South Korea, and the EU stand out for significant efforts to improve domestic capacity and create an international enabling environment. However, most other countries are evenly distributed in this category and either fall under limited efforts or needs improvement. Despite their economic progress and capability to support climate action internationally, developed countries such as the US, Russia, Canada, and Australia report inadequate performance. This results from their shortfalls in ensuring fairness of contributions towards climate finance and limitations in delivery.

Climate adaptation efforts assess a country’s readiness and recovery capacity in response to current and changing climate impacts. While developed countries are relatively better prepared domestically with strong readiness and recovery measures in place, all countries need to improve in this area. Despite facing the most severe consequences of climate change, developing countries are less prepared to mitigate these impacts. Additionally, developing countries’ efforts are often constrained by domestic funding and institutional capacity.

G. Some key recommendations

A comprehensive review of the actions taken by G20 members reveals a concerning situation: no country currently qualifies as a ‘climate leader’, but a few developed and developing countries exhibit efforts that can be deemed reasonable in scale or impact. Their limited initiatives and insufficient accountability underscore a significant gap in the ambition necessary for realising effective climate solutions. To bridge the gap, here are some broad areas of action:

• Developed countries must consistently participate and adhere to UNFCCC obligations: To advance action on international climate commitments, it is essential that developed countries consistently engage in climate agreements. The analysis reveals that 6 out of 11 developed countries show inconsistent participation, signalling the need for more reliable engagement. Such inconsistent participation not only weakens collective momentum but also undermines trust and credibility. In addition, countries must also adhere to reporting deadlines, reinforce transparency and strengthen the credibility of commitments. Moreover, countries should strive to improve their disclosures, specifically in NDCs, expanding their scope and coverage. However, given the resource and technical constraints in developing countries, it is imperative for developed countries to provide adequate technical and financial support to facilitate this. Independent research institutes can also play a crucial role using such disclosures to offer evidencebased inputs to inform policymakers and hold countries accountable for their actions.

• Developed countries should accelerate the pace of transition to net-zero: Many developed countries are taking more years to transition to netzero (51 years on average) and are not in line to meet the 43 per cent emission reduction of 2019 levels by 2030, a global average goal needed to limit warming to 1.5°C. The developed world needs to accelerate emissions reductions by setting ambitious targets, bridging the implementation gap, and expediting its transition to net-zero. This approach is vital to ensure sufficient carbon space for developing countries to address their socio-economic development challenges.

• Ensure a fair transition for developed and developing countries: The assessment indicates that developing countries remain reliant on coal and cannot immediately transition fuel usage as rapidly as the 1.5°C pathways set out in light of resource constraints and technical capacity. Consequently, developed countries should phase out their fossil fuel consumption (oil and gas). This also aligns with CBDR-RC, where the mandate is shifted to developed countries with more historical responsibility. In the future, there should be an equal focus on coal, oil, and gas to ensure a fair transition away from fossil fuels, keeping in mind the capacity to transition and minimise economic harm for emerging economies.

• Developed countries should improve both the quantity and quality of climate finance to address critical gaps in delivery and fairness: None of the developed countries has deposited 100 per cent of the funds they had pledged; and with the exceptions of France, Germany, and Japan, all developed countries are severely short of making their fair share of contributions. Therefore, developed countries must enhance both the flow and accessibility of climate finance according to the needs of developing countries. As COP29 approaches, discussions on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) should be reinforced and anchored in qualitative and quantitative needs, with a target and structure that responds to the lessons learned from the annual USD 100 billion goal and commitment to support nationally-led climate plans.

• Foster balanced contribution to adaptation and loss and damage: Despite reporting a standalone increase in adaptation finance, nearly 80 per cent of countries record a skewed contribution toward mitigation efforts – almost thrice as much funds were allocated to mitigation than to adaptation. Further, total commitment to loss and damage (currently at USD 702 million) continues to lag at the global forum, and the highest pledge by any G20 country is only USD 111.55 million (UNFCCC, 2024). To address this imbalance, climate finance contributions must extend beyond mitigation to encompass robust efforts in adaptation and loss and damage. These must be embedded in a comprehensive manner to build on the fragmented, sector-specific, and incremental efforts that are currently prevalent.

• While enhanced adaptation is the mandate across the board, developing countries must be adequately supported: Developed countries are faring well domestically in overall adaptation efforts, but developing countries, which bear the brunt of climate events, remain relatively less equipped to mitigate climate impacts. Given this, they need greater support in building adequate resources, infrastructural capacity, and policy support to build sustainable physical, financial, and technical infrastructure through increased investment and financing. Additionally, critical areas of risk mapping remain inadequate, and it is important for all countries to ensure better data collection to bridge the reporting gap. This could be supported by building technical capacity and making use of existing technical (World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), Santiago Network, FrLD Secretariat, thematic groups) and financial platforms to leverage their resources and expertise.

In conclusion, in light of different national circumstances, countries are required to put forth stronger NDCs under the Paris Agreement. In this regard, developed countries must take the lead by exceeding the global emission reduction average required to keep the 1.5°C target alive by enhancing their 2030 NDCs beyond 43 per cent reduction from their 2019 levels. They must also pledge to meet their net-zero targets well before 2050. In a world increasingly affected by climateinduced disasters and geo-political tensions, delays in translating pledges into acts are no longer viable. Hence, accountability is critical for ensuring ambitious and accelerated climate action.