A decade after the Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015 and hailed as the world’s most ambitious climate commitment to limit warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, the gap between stated ambition and actual action remains stark. The limited efforts over the years have led to escalating impacts, with the world experiencing, on average, one disaster a day over the past five decades, resulting in daily losses of USD 202 million (Jones 2022).

This climate crisis is likely to worsen further due to evolving geopolitical dynamics that have introduced new uncertainties in the global climate regime. The United States’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, along with its reversal of domestic climate regulations, shows how political changes can produce rapid and significant policy reversals in the energy transition sphere, raising concerns about accountability and underscoring the fragility of climate cooperation. The war in the West Asia has further halted momentum, pushing climate priorities to the margins of international politics.

Despite these geopolitical uncertainties, the obligation to deliver on climate commitments remains, as the consequences of inaction compound each year. To achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, countries have been communicating their targets through Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Previously, they set targets for 2030; and last year, they were expected to submit more ambitious targets for 2035 as part of NDC 3.0, informed by the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake.

However, a few questions remain. How are countries performing on their commitments? Which countries in the negotiating groups are on track, and which are falling short? What is the collective progress of these negotiating groups under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)? This analysis is important, as these groups influence the direction and effectiveness of global climate governance by building internal coherence, setting the agenda, and holding other groups accountable. While the countries in these groups often have diverse national climate policies, they tend to align strategically within the UNFCCC process to strengthen their collective bargaining power and advance shared interests in climate negotiations.

In this regard, we assess the climate performance of the following key negotiating groups:

• The Umbrella consists of Australia, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, Ukraine, the United States, and the United Kingdom
• The EU (27), consisting of the European Union’s 27 member states
• The Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) includes Georgia, Mexico, Liechtenstein, Monaco, South Korea and Switzerland.
• The BASIC, which is Brazil, China, India, and South Africa

We did not include other negotiating groups,11 as they submit at their discretion or due to limited data availability across member countries. We examine progress against national climate commitments to understand each group’s collective progress. For this, we mainly draw on datasets reported by countries in the first Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs), including data from Common Reporting Tables (CRT) and the Common Tabular Format (CTF), in line with the requirements of the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF).

In Section 2, we examine historical emissions trends and assess how emission trajectories have evolved in the pre Paris (2009–15) and post-Paris (2016–22) eras. Next, we evaluate progress against the 2030 and 2035 NDC targets. In Section 4, we analyse the implications of these emissions pathways for achieving net-zero goals. Finally, we conclude this issue brief in Section 5.

The countries within the negotiating groups had submitted their climate targets primarily for 2030. More recently, they have also begun communicating updated targets – NDC 3.0 – signalling the next phase of ambition until 2035. However, it remains to be seen whether they are on track to achieve these targets.

These climate commitments take various forms. Mostly, economy-wide emission-reduction targets were set by the Umbrella, the EU, and the EIG. The BASIC countries have set varied targets in their NDCs, including emissions intensity, emissions peaking, carbon sink creation, and expansion of non-fossil-fuel energy capacity, among others.

In their official reports, these countries provide data on projected emissions and indicators related to NDCs. To reflect on the progress of countries within the Umbrella, the EU, and the EIG, we analysed their projected emissions against their NDC targets. Given the varied nature of NDCs, we used indicators to assess the BASIC group’s current progress.

Assessing where the countries within the Umbrella, the EU, and the EIG stand

Countries in the Umbrella, the EU, and the EIG have adopted diverse climate target levels in their NDCs. Meanwhile, the EU has collectively adopted a single NDC, reflecting a collaborative approach to climate action across its 27 member countries. Table 1 shows how countries within these groups are aligning with their targets based on their projected emissions.

Table 1. Only a few countries in the Umbrella, the EU, and EIG are projected to meet their 2030 and 2035 targets

Source: Authors’ analysis.
he targets are taken from the countries’ respective NDCs. Red represents projected emissions that are not aligned with their target, while green represents those aligned with their targets. Blue represents an increase in projected emissions rather than a reduction as per the target.

We observed that Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Ukraine are projected to meet both their 2030 and 2035 targets. Norway is projected to only meet its 2030 target, whereas New Zealand is projected to meet its 2035 commitment. Other countries, such as Iceland in the Umbrella group and South Korea in the EIG, are projected to increase emissions rather than meet their 2030 and 2035 reduction targets.

Collectively, the Umbrella, the EU, and the EIG are projected to emit 9 per cent more in 2030 than their NDC target levels. For their 2035 target, this is projected to increase to 19 per cent.

Given that many countries are at different stages of meeting their 2030 targets, they need to significantly increase their annual emissions reduction in comparison to reductions achieved before 2022 (between the base year and 2022). For example, within the Umbrella group, the UK would need to more than double its annual emissions reduction rate to 5.4 per cent after 2022, compared to the pre-2022 rate. Similarly, the US and Canada would need to increase their yearly emissions reduction rates by 5 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively, after 2022, compared to their earlier rate. This also holds for the EU, which needs to reduce emissions by 4.8 per cent annually after 2022 – almost four times its earlier rate.

Assessing the current progress of the BASIC group towards its commitments

Countries in the BASIC group have diverse national circumstances and reporting capabilities. Their climate commitments reflect different pathways towards emissions reduction. Given their limited reported data, we analysed their current progress against the selfreported NDC indicators for 2030 commitments.

Table 2. The BASIC countries show varying levels of alignment with their 2030 commitments

Source: Authors’ analysis.
Note: LULUCF - Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry

Table 2 demonstrates that countries in the BASIC group have varying levels of alignment toward their 2030 targets. India shows significant progress, having already exceeded 50 per cent of its cumulative installed electric power capacity from non-fossil fuel sources, and is on track to exceed its target of reducing the emissions intensity of its GDP by 45 per cent by 2030 (Das et al. 2025). Further, it has created an additional carbon sink of 2.44 billion tonnes of CO₂e, moving further towards its target of sequestering 2.5–3 billion tonnes of CO₂e by 2030.

Similarly, China has made substantial progress, already exceeding its target of raising the total installed capacity of wind and solar power to over 1,200 GW by 2030, and of increasing forest stock volume by 6 billion m³ by 203030 from 2005. It has reduced energy-related CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP by about 50.9 per cent relative to 2005 levels, compared to its 2030 reduction target of 65 per cent (People’s Republic of China 2024). In its energy mix, non-fossil fuels accounted for 17.9 per cent.

Also, South Africa seems to be aligning with its target, since its national GHG emissions and removals in 2022 are within its target level. In contrast, Brazil achieved a 20.4 per cent reduction the same year; its 2030 reduction target is 53.1 per cent.

There is a growing disconnect between stated climate ambition in NDCs and projected implementation, particularly among the Umbrella, the EU, and the EIG groups. Emissions trajectories portrayed in BTRs clearly indicate that the major countries in these negotiating groups are not aligned to meet their mitigation targets for both 2030 and 2035. In contrast, the BASIC countries are Figure 2. Negotiating groups rely on after 2030 reductions to achieve net zero by 2050 Source: Authors’ analysis. Holding up the Mirror: Tracking Climate Action across UNFCCC Negotiating Groups in the Era of Geopolitical Uncertainty considered self-reported projections for 2030. Given the limited data on the projections of the BASIC group, our analysis only covers the Umbrella, the EU, and the EIG.33 As Figure 2 shows, all three groups need to significantly increase their annual emission reduction after 2030 to achieve net zero by 2050. Within the Umbrella, the United States, followed by Japan and Canada, would need to significantly increase its emissions reductions after 2030, and in the EIG, South Korea would also need to follow a similar path. more aligned with their 2030 commitments despite their lower historical responsibility and greater developmental constraints. As the climate debate progresses in this dynamic geopolitical context, opportunities should be explored to strengthen and align 2035 NDC targets with accelerated short-term action to prevent the projected overshoot and ensure credible implementation.